The author discusses the meaning of the paradox, which rises as a result of the controversy between the principles of scientific ethos (R. Merton) and fallibilism (K. Popper). She argues that the justification of the moral authority of science should not depend on this paradox. The author uses Max Weber’s concept of substantive rationality to consider the idea of social legitimation of science. She argues for understanding expertise as a special mode of scientific knowledge which aims at justifying the authority (...) of science in the society. (shrink)

The author analyzes the phenomenon of denialism (denial of scientific consensus out of the normative boundaries of scientific discussion). The intellectual origins (including connection with P. Feyerabend’s post-positivism), sociocultural characteristics and political aspects of this phenomenon are discussed. The author defends the thesis that denialism is associated with scientism – non-reflexive trust in science, which is used for unscrupulous manipulations for the purpose of political influence. As an example, she considers the South African expert case related to HIV denial in (...) the early 2000s. The author believes that denialism needs a comprehensive analysis that takes into account the interdependence of its intellectual and socio-political foundations. (shrink)

The article reconstructs the premises of the reception of analytic philosophy in jurisprudence and shows that the development of a method for clarifying the meanings of legal concepts is not least connected with the problem of legitimizing law enforcement. The article analyzes H.L.A. Hart’s approach to the problem of correlation between the “letter” and “spirit” of the law in the process of interpreting legal norms. The article argues that the process of interpretation is determined teleologically. In its limit, the interpretation (...) of legal norms presupposes the re-creation of the desired image of society, the reconstruction of such social ontology that is most consistent with the ideal of achieving social welfare. The article examines the collision of the “ideal of order” and the “ideal of justice” as two regulations of law enforcement. The author believes that the interpretation of this collision within the analytical tradition was characterized by a gradual movement from the ideal of “mechanical” law enforcement, which minimizes the creative role of the interpreter, to the ideal of flexible interpretation focused on achieving legal goals in a changing environment. It is noted that, according to analytic approach, a theoretical solution to this conflict was proposed due to the development of the ideas of an “open texture” of law. The author demonstrates that the development of the analytic tradition in jurisprudence has shown that the criticism of language and the interpretation of meanings are not technical tasks, but it presupposes the construction of a metaphysics of law. In this regard, the author concludes: the development of the ideas of the analytic tradition in jurisprudence demonstrates that the thesis about the absence of a positive program in analytic philosophy, put forward in the first article of the discussion, can be challenged. (shrink)

The author advocates the idea about the connection between the spirit of early Victorian England and the birth of philosophy of science. She pays special attention to the arguments provided by W. Whewell in support of “the scientific turn” of English university education. The author argues that the public intellectual discussions organized by the leading English daily magazines (i.e. Tatler, Spectator) played their role the formation of the public sphere (J. Habermas) in this period. These discussions contributed to the search (...) for a normative consensus between the bourgeoisie and the land aristocracy. (shrink)